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1. According to the ‘Guide-
line of the ECB of 20 Sep-
tember 2011 on monetary
policy instruments and pro-
cedures of the Eurosystem’,
all Eurosystem credit opera-
tions (ie liquidity-providing
monetary policy operations
and intraday credit) have to
be based on adequate col-
lateral. Liquidity-providing
monetary policy operations
include the Main Refinanc-
ing Operations and the
Long-Term Refinancing
Operations. The Eurosystem
has developed a single
framework for eligible col-
lateral common to all
Eurosystem credit opera-
tions (also referred to as the
‘Single List’).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
All Eurosystem credit operations, including the
important open market operations, need to be
based on adequate collateral. This means that
when extending loans, the central bank requires
collateral (assets pledged as security) to protect
its balance sheet against the risk of default by the
borrower (credit risk). The collateral is accepted at
market price subject to a haircut. The haircut is
applied to insure against liquidity risk and down-
ward changes in the prices of the collateral.
The Eurosystem adopted its collateral framework
during the crisis to accept lower-rated assets as
collateral. The adaptation of the collateral frame-
work was necessary to provide sufficient liquidity
to banks in the euro-area periphery in particular,
but also to some banks in the core. More than 80
percent of European Central Bank liquidity (Main
Refinancing Operations, MRO, and Long Term Refi-
nancing Operations, LTRO) is provided to five coun-
tries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
Haircuts were increased to insure against the
greater liquidity risk and greater price volatility of
lower-rated assets. In crisis countries, special
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) was pro-
vided. ELA is provided by national central banks
with the approval of the ECB governing council
against collateral that does not meet the ECB’s col-
lateral standard. Potential losses from ELA opera-
tions would be borne by the national central bank. 
In general, any collateral framework has an impact
on prices and allocations. The ECB’s framework
aims to minimise this impact by taking collateral
at market prices. Nevertheless, prior to the crisis,
the ECB’s collateral framework was criticised as
reducing liquidity risk premia and thereby con-
tributing to the insufficient differentiation of sov-
ereign risk. However, it is unlikely that this effect
was substantial. In the crisis period, the ECB’s col-
lateral policy was criticised on the grounds that it
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would allow the funding of large current account
deficits in the face of a balance-of-payments
crisis. Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) thus
argued that ECB liquidity – as a result of the
changed collateral policy – had an impact on allo-
cation of consumption and investment. 
While it is true that without ECB liquidity, adjust-
ment of current accounts in the periphery would
have been more rapid, the ECB policy was still
legitimate. In particular, the changes to the collat-
eral framework were necessary for the ECB to fulfil
its treaty-based mandate of providing liquidity to
solvent banks and safeguarding financial stabil-
ity. Without lowering the minimum required rating,
banks in a number of countries would have been
without access to the ECB liquidity window. Ulti-
mately, the decision to stop granting liquidity to
banks in one country of the monetary union is out-
side the scope of monetary policy. The creation of
a banking union will mitigate some of the prob-
lems related to collateral policy. Overall, the ECB
appropriately adapted its collateral framework and
policy in the course of the crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Open market operations represent the key mone-
tary policy instruments used by the ECB. All
Eurosystem credit operations, including open
market operations, need to be based on adequate
collateral. This means that when extending loans,
the central bank requires collateral (assets
pledged as security) to protect its balance sheet
against the risk of default by the borrower (credit
risk). Monetary policy in the euro area is largely
operated through the lending of central bank
money to banks with fixed maturities and at a cer-
tain interest rate against collateral. Among the
most important examples are the Main Refinanc-
ing Operations (MRO) and Long-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs)1. Banks pledge collateral
against these loans. Figure 1 shows the composi-
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tion of the ECB balance sheet. The main driver of
changes in the size of the balance sheet are liq-
uidity operations, for which collateral is needed. 
The definition of what is eligible as collateral is
therefore of central importance for the implemen-
tation of monetary policy in the euro area. The
Eurosystem introduced a single list of eligible col-
lateral in January 20072. A collateral framework is
based on a number of central considerations. Its
central aim is to protect the balance sheet of the
ECB and thereby its shareholders and ultimately
taxpayers against undue risks. In the liquidity
operations, the counterpart to the ECB is the bank
that receives liquidity. The bank is required to
return the liquidity after a certain period to the
ECB, at which point it will recover the collateral.
Only when the bank is unable to re-pay the liquid-
ity it previously received, can the ECB use the col-
lateral to prevent a loss. The value of the collateral
should therefore reflect the amount of liquidity
given to the bank. The aim of the collateral frame-
work is to define a framework that provides the
Eurosystem with adequate protection against
losses, while defining enough eligible collateral so
that solvent banks can access enough central
bank liquidity. The framework is defined in the
document ‘The implementation of monetary
policy in the euro area: General documentation on
Eurosystem monetary policy instruments and
procedures’3 and subsequent updates.
Adequate access to ECB liquidity is of vital impor-
tance for banks and for the implementation of
monetary policy. Banks need access to central
bank liquidity for their daily operations. In partic-
ular, when interbank markets are under stress, the
banking system relies heavily on central bank liq-
uidity. The way the ECB regulates the access to
central bank liquidity is, in turn, a central part of
monetary policy. The collateral framework plays
an important role in this regard.
The Eurosystem's collateral framework is from
time to time subject to political and academic
criticism. Buiter and Sibert (2004) were perhaps
2. Before that date, the col-
lateral framework was
divided into two tiers. The
first tier consisted of mar-
ketable debt instruments
that have uniform eligibility
criteria for the euro-area
countries set by the ECB.
Tier 2 consisted of assets
that were of particular
importance for national
financial markets. The eligi-
bility criteria were set by
the national central banks.
In January 2007, the
Eurosystem moved to a
single collateral list.
German banks were keen to
include bank loans in the
definition of collateral. See
Bundesbank, Monthly Bul-
letin, April 2006
http://www.bundesbank.de/Red
aktion/EN/Downloads/Publica-
tions/Monthly_Report_Arti-
cles/2006/2006_04_eligible_coll
ateral.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
3. Guideline ECB/2011/14.
‘Recent criticism of the Eurosystem's collateral framework has focused on the role of the
collateral system in allowing the financing of capital withdrawals from the euro-area periphery
during the recent balance-of-payment crisis.’
among the most vocal and early critics arguing
that the collateral treatment of sovereign debt by
the Eurosystem was at least in part responsible
for the small sovereign yield differentials in the
euro area. In particular, they argue that despite the
differences between triple A and single A ratings,
all sovereign debt was accepted as collateral at
the same haircut. By not properly differentiating
the liquidity risk, the Eurosystem would implicitly
weaken fiscal discipline. More recent criticism
focused on the role of the collateral system in
allowing the financing of capital withdrawals from
the euro-area periphery during the recent balance-
of-payment crisis.
In this note, we review the collateral framework of
the Eurosystem and how it has developed during
the crisis. We then add some considerations about
the potential impact of the collateral framework on
pricing and asset allocations, before drawing
some conclusions.
THE ECB’s CHANGING COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK
The main parameters for a collateral system are
the definition of which assets are acceptable as
collateral, what is the required rating of assets for
them to be accepted as collateral and what is the
imposed haircut on the market value of the asset.
During the crisis, the ECB adapted all three criteria
of the collateral framework.
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Figure 1: Assets of the European Central Bank (€ billions)
Source: ECB and Bruegel.
be subject to a minimal haircut of 1.5-2.5%. Gov-
ernment debt rated between BBB* and BBB-, in
contrast, would be subject to a haircut of 9-10%. 
During the crisis, the Eurosystem substantially
adapted its collateral framework to ensure ade-
quate access to liquidity. The ECB had to adapt the
collateral standards in order to be able to provide
sufficient liquidity to banks that were experienc-
ing liquidity shortages. In particular, when the
interbank market froze, the ECB had to fulfil its role
as a lender of last resort and provide the banking
system with adequate liquidity.
More specifically, the ECB adapted its rating stan-
dards as well as the haircuts applied to collateral.
As top-rated collateral in the banking system
became less available, the ECB lowered the mini-
mum required rating. To compensate for the
increasing riskiness (ie increased volatility during
the crisis), the ECB also increased the applied hair-
cuts. 
Figure 2 on the next page shows the develop-
ments in credit rating thresholds of the ECB’s col-
lateral framework since 2008 for a number of
assets. The following major steps can be noted:
• At the start of the crisis:
• All eligible collateral except ABS: credit rating
threshold at A–
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Table 1 summarises the asset classes that the
Eurosystem and other major central banks accept
as collateral. The ECB accepts a greater variety of
assets than other central banks. The Fed, for
example, only accepts central government bonds
and bonds of public sector institutions other than
central governments. This is sufficient for the Fed
to provide liquidity to the US banking system. In
the euro area, in contrast, the banking system is
not only much larger than in the US, it is also much
more heterogeneous and embedded in 18
different national (legal and historical) systems.
A broader definition of collateral is therefore
necessary. 
The basic idea of the collateral framework is that
lower-rated collateral is only accepted against
bigger haircuts. While liquidity is only provided at
the market value of the asset, thereby taking into
account higher default risks as priced in the mar-
kets, the bigger haircut for lower rated collateral
compensates for the greater risk of changes in val-
uation that lower-rated collateral represent for the
Eurosystem, and for the higher liquidity risk of
these assets. Tables A1 and A2 in the annex
describe the different categories of collateral
according to rating and liquidity and the haircut
applied. The lower the rating, the bigger the hair-
cut. For example, central government debt with the
best rating and a maturity of 3-5 years would only
Table 1: Asset-classes eligible as collateral for major central banks
Collateral Eurosystem BoE Riksbank SNB Fed BoJ
Marketable assets
Debt instruments issued by: 
Central governments • • • • • •
Central banks • • • •
Public sector institutions other than central govts • • • • • •
Supranational institutions • • • • •
Credit institutions (covered bonds) • • • •
Credit institutions (excluding covered bonds) • •
Corporations (other than credit institutions) • • • • •
Asset-backed securities (ABS) • • •
Equities
Money market funds
Gold
Non-marketable assets
Credit claims (bank loans) • •
Non-marketable retail mortgage-backed debt instruments • •
Cash as collateral 
Cash including fixed-term deposits from eligible parties •
Source: ECB (2013), Collateral eligibility requirements: a comparative study across specific frameworks, July 2013
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/collateralframeworksen.pdf).
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4. In the case of Greece,
Greek government bonds
were falling below the rating
threshold necessary to be
accepted as collateral. The
ECB therefore announced a
change to the eligibility cri-
teria for Greek government
debt specifically and
applied a special haircut on
19 December 2012. See
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ress/pr/date/2012/html/pr1
21219.en.html.
only loans to SMEs reduced to A- at issuance
and at any time subsequently (ECB/2011/25).
• 20 June 2012: credit threshold of ABS based
on auto loans, leasing, commercial mortgages,
consumer finance, residential mortgages or
loans to SMEs reduced to BBB- at issuance and
at any time subsequently.
• 9 July 2014: credit threshold of ABS based on
auto loans, leasing, commercial mortgages,
consumer finance, residential mortgages,
loans to SMEs or credit card receivables
reduced to BBB- at issuance and at any time
subsequently (ECB/2014/31).
The ECB significantly changed the haircuts it
applies to several types of collateral. Figure 3
shows the changes in the haircut for a number of
marketable assets. The haircuts for high rated
uncovered bank bonds (with 5-7 year residual
maturity) and ABS were increased by about 150
percent to 12.5 percent and 16 percent respec-
tively in September 2010. As already mentioned,
the credit threshold of all eligible collateral except
ABS was lowered to BBB- in 2008, conditional on
an additional 5 percent haircut. Certain types of
low-rated ABS became eligible as collateral only in
2012 or later. With the recent improvement in
market sentiment, the size of the haircuts applied
to uncovered bank bonds, high-rated ABS and
some types of low-rated ABS was reduced again. 
For government bonds, the Eurosystem modified
the applied haircuts only slightly. At the start of
the crisis only high-rated government debt instru-
ments were accepted as collateral (remember that
the minimum threshold on all marketable assets
except ABS was A-). These were given a valuation
haircut of 3 percent for assets with a 5-7 year
residual maturity. When lower-rated government
bonds became eligible, it was at an additional 5
percent haircut, at 8 percent. These haircuts
remained constant until September 2013 when
the haircuts of high-rated and lower-rated govern-
ment bonds were changed to 2 percent and 10
percent respectively. However, for crisis countries,
the ECB changed its collateral framework a
number of times to allow government debt to
become acceptable as collateral again. Greek gov-
ernment bonds became eligible despite being
below the BBB- minimum rating subject to a spe-
cial haircut in December 20124. In May 2013, a
• All ABS: credit rating threshold at AAA
• 22 October 2008: credit rating threshold of all
eligible collateral except ABS lowered to BBB-
as a temporary measure. It was decided on 8
April 2008 that this measure was to be made
permanent (ECB/2011/14).
• 8 December 2011: credit threshold of ABS
based on either only residential mortgages or
All eligible collateral except ABSs
ABSs backed by comm. mortgages, car loans, leasing, consumer finance
ABSs backed by residential mortgages or loans to SMEs
ABSs backed by credit card receivables
Other ABSs
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Figure 2: Credit rating thresholds of the ECB’s
collateral framework
Source: Bruegel based on European Central Bank. Note: Credit
ratings following Fitch and Standard and Poor’s rating system.
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the ECB collateral framework
Source: Bruegel based on European Central Bank. Notes: The
haircuts of uncovered bank bonds and government debt
instruments shown are those for assets with a residual maturity
of 5-7 years. Haircuts shown are for fixed coupon assets. High-
rated: AAA to A-. Low-rated: BBB+ to BBB-. Lines are not
continuous because those asset classes were not eligible as
collateral beforehand. Individual asset-backed securities,
covered bank bonds (jumbo covered bank bonds, traditional
covered bank bonds and other covered bank bonds) and
uncovered bank bonds that are theoretically valued in
accordance with Section 6.5 of the ‘Guidelines on monetary
policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem’ are
subject to an additional valuation haircut. This haircut is directly
applied at the level of the theoretical valuation of the individual
debt instrument in the form of a valuation markdown of 5 percent.
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similar decision was taken for Cypriot debt, a deci-
sion that was reversed already in July 2013
thanks to the rating upgrade5.
Figures 4 and 5 show the availability and use of
collateral in the Eurosystem. As can be seen, the
eligible collateral amounts to €14 trillion, the
largest part of it being central government bonds.
During the crisis, the allocation of ECB liquidity to
different countries changed substantially. More
and more ECB liquidity went to the banking sys-
tems of weaker countries. Figure 6 shows that the
amount of liquidity in those countries increased
substantially up to the summer of 2012 when the
announcement of the OMT programme calmed
markets. The share of liquidity of banks in five
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Source: European Central Bank.
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euro-area countries (IT, ES, PT, IE, GR) in total ECB
liquidity currently exceeds 80 percent.
In the crisis countries, the Eurosystem experi-
enced the particular difficulty of having to provide
liquidity to banks of countries that were on the
brink of insolvency and had to ask for financial
assistance. In these countries, the rating of assets
that were held by the banking system often
dropped significantly, which put severe limits on
the ability of these banks to access ECB liquidity
directly. At the same time, the ECB did not want to
lower collateral standards even further because it
was feared that the ECB would take too much risk
on board. The solution to this problem was the so-
called ‘ELA’, or ‘Emergency Liquidity Assistance’.
ELA needs to be approved by the ECB governing
council. The approval of the governing council is
needed because ELA operations influence the
amount of liquidity available in the euro area and
therefore the monetary policy stance. ELA is
essentially provided because of lack of available
appropriate collateral for normal monetary policy
operations. In ELA, the liquidity is given by the
national central bank to banks resident in the
country against lower quality collateral. For exam-
ple, the collateral could be below-credit-threshold
sovereign bonds. If the bank that receives liquid-
ity is unable to redeem the liquidity with the
national central bank, then the national central
bank uses the low-quality collateral to avoid
losses. If there are losses, those losses remain
with the national central bank and are not losses
of the Eurosystem.
Figure 7 shows the changing levels of ELA to
banks in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and even Bel-
gium, which needed special liquidity during its
banking crisis. As can be seen, the amounts of liq-
uidity made available via the instrument were
quite substantial at the heights of the respective
crises. This also shows that the collateral frame-
work did impose limits on the standard access to
liquidity in a number of countries.
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON IMPACT OF
COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK ON ASSET
ALLOCATIONS AND PRICES
There is only a limited literature that discusses the
impact of the collateral framework on asset allo-
cation and prices in the euro area. In general, col-
lateral influences market prices because in an
exchange between two parties the collateral will
reduce information uncertainties. Geanakoplos
and Zame (2007) show that, in a general equilib-
rium model, the availability of collateral in an
economy when there is a possibility of default
affects prices in a number of markets as well as
the allocation of assets. Brumm et al (2013) argue
along similar lines. Chapman et al (2011) develop
a general framework for central bank haircut
policy and argue that the haircut insures against
two types of risk: liquidity risk and downside risk
of the price of the collateral. Setting a haircut
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Figure 7: Emergency Liquidity Assistance to banks in Ireland and Greece
Source: Bank of Greece, Central Bank of Ireland, Central Bank of Cyprus, Central Bank of Belgium. Note: Since ELA operations are
not very transparent, the amounts of ELA are proxied by the category ‘Other Assets’ in the respective national central banks’
balance sheets before April 2012, and the category ‘Other claims on euro-area credit institutions denominated in euro’. This
change was due to a harmonisation of data publication in the euro area. In the case of Belgium we proxy ELA operations only
by the ‘Other claims on euro-area credit institutions denominated in euro’ category.
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involves a trade-off between the liquidity needs of
the counterparties and portfolio choices. The Bank
of Canada (2011) described how the collateral
system is based on the mark-to-market principle
and on applied haircuts. The report argues that
haircuts can affect asset allocations and that,
during extreme crises, the central bank should
actually reduce haircuts in order to mitigate the
shortage of liquidity.
In principle, the aim of the collateral framework of
the Eurosystem is to avoid distorting prices and
allocation. The basic idea is that assets are priced
in markets and that the collateral framework does
not alter the prices. The former chief economist of
the ECB, Issing (2005), argued that:
“All financial assets offered as collateral,
including government bonds, are valued daily
at market prices. In its collateral policy, the ECB
therefore relies on the judgment of the market
to distinguish among government bonds and,
implicitly, the fiscal behaviour of member
states. Moreover, the ECB sets credit standards
for the eligibility of assets as collateral and is
bound by the Treaty not to distinguish between
government and private issuers in the imple-
mentation of these standards.”
Issing therefore argues that markets decide on the
prices of both private and public assets, and the
ECB provides liquidity only against the market
price of those assets. 
Buiter and Sibert (2005) contradict this view and
argue that the fact that all sovereign debt at the
time was placed in the same category not only
suggested to markets that sovereign debt has
equal solvency, but also that it has equal liquid-
ity. As the Eurosystem is a large player in the Euro-
markets, this signal increased the liquidity of
Greek and other bonds substantially and thereby
lowered spreads. The artificial liquidity enhance-
ment, they argue, would matter for the valuation
and the valued credit risk of sovereign debt. While
such a liquidity effect is possible, it is doubtful that
this was one of the main drivers of low sovereign
bond spreads prior to the crisis. In fact, liquidity
risk premia are estimated to be rather small com-
pared to the more important solvency risk premia.
The low differentiation of sovereign yields is there-
fore rather a sign of a market assessment that sol-
vency risks were comparable. 
With the downgrade of a number of sovereign debt
instruments during the crisis, the Eurosystem had
to adapt its collateral framework to allow banks to
have sufficient eligible collateral and to be able to
continue to access liquidity. Several sovereign
debt instruments are now subject to larger hair-
cuts than the top-rated sovereign debt instru-
ments, to reflect their lower liquidity and their
greater market price volatility. 
Anecdotal evidence from rating agencies suggests
that the collateral framework as such does not
influence the ratings of banks. However, banks
that rely on large amounts of ECB liquidity receive
a worse rating ceteris paribus6. This should not,
however, be confounded with the impact of the
collateral framework as such. On the contrary, the
lowering of collateral standards was done in order
to support the access of banks to liquidity.
The ECB had to significantly adapt its collateral
framework when banks in the euro-area periphery
found it increasingly difficult to access liquidity in
the interbank markets. This was particularly the
case when the sovereign debt crisis was at its
peak and investors and banks feared not only that
governments could default on their debt but also
that countries could leave the euro and re-intro-
duce national currencies. In fact, when sovereign
ratings fell below A-, a change in the collateral
framework was necessary because most other
assets in the same economy would have a rating
below the government debt rating. In this particu-
lar situation, the ECB acted according to its treaty-
given mandate: to provide liquidity to the banking
system and prevent a financial crisis. It did so in a
prudent manner by accepting collateral only at
market price and applying a larger haircut for less
credit-worthy assets. Limits on collateral avail-
ability would have implied limits on Target 2 bal-
ances7, which would have meant that even solvent
banks would have had to default because of the
lack of liquidity8. This would have violated a fun-
damental principle of central banking, which is to
provide abundant liquidity to solvent banks in
order to prevent financial crises. Limits on liquid-
ity provisioning would thus not only have resulted
in bank defaults, but could have triggered a major
6. See p37 of Standard and
Poors (2011) Banks: rating
methodology and assump-
tions, 9 November.
7. The Target 2 system is
the payment system of the
euro area. During the crisis,
large creditor and debtor
positions built up for differ-
ent countries of the euro
area. These balances
reflected the amount of liq-
uidity provided by the cen-
tral bank on which the local
banking system had to rely.
8. See Wolff (2011) ‘Lack of
collateral will stop euro
flows’, Financial Times, 8
June,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/8079d8cc-9179-11e0-
b1ea-00144feab49a.html.
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9. In the case of the Cypriot
programme, the ECB
arguably endangered the
continuity of the euro by
accepting capital controls
with the aim of preventing a
further built-up of Target 2
balances. For a critique, see
Wolff (2013) ‘Capital con-
trols in Cyprus will put euro
at risk’, Financial Times, 25
March,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/dc0159dc-9301-11e2-
b3be-00144feabdc0.html
and ‘Capital controls in
Cyprus: the end of Target
2?’, Bruegel Blog 23 March
2013,
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/b
log/detail/article/1054-cap-
ital-controls-in-cyprus-the-
end-of-target2/.
financial crisis with possible exits of countries
from the euro.
The adaptation of the collateral framework was
necessary to allow access to finance during the
severe balance-of-payments crisis of the euro-
area periphery during 2010-12. This policy has
been criticised by, for example, Sinn and Wollmer-
shäuser (2011) as a de-facto fiscal bail-out. The
authors argue that the ECB liquidity provisioning
in fact permitted a slower adjustment of current
accounts – in other words, the collateral policy
has an impact on consumption, investment and
allocation. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) also
interpret the capital outflows as a balance-of-pay-
ments crisis and argue that a tightening of collat-
eral standards could have limited the Target 2
increases. However, such a step could not have
been undertaken quickly without endangering the
stability of the financial system.
The altered distribution of liquidity in the Eurosys-
tem can, however, also be interpreted as a normal
liquidity operation providing funds to banks that
experience a liquidity run. As the banks are judged
to be solvent by the relevant supervisor, such liq-
uidity provisioning is a normal part of central bank
action. Some evidence suggests that banks with
questionable solvency used the collateral frame-
work for continued access to liquidity with a view
to delaying insolvency recognition. For example,
Monte dei Paschi issued state guaranteed bonds
that were then repurchased to be used as collat-
eral for transactions with the Eurosystem. This
example shows that the Eurosystem faced a very
difficult situation because it had to rely on local
supervisors’ assessments of the solvency of
banks in its liquidity operations. The creation of a
system of common supervision was therefore of
great importance not least for the ECB's liquidity
operations.
Overall, the ECB fulfilled its treaty-given mandate
as a central bank for the entire euro area by adapt-
ing its collateral framework during the crisis. If it
had acted differently, it would have put limits on
access to liquidity and ultimately on the ability of
countries to remain in the euro – a choice that is
outside its mandate9. With its changes in collateral
policy, it did not unduly influence asset alloca-
tions and prices, nor did it take on board excessive
risks thanks to haircuts and mark-to market policy.
Completing the banking union is desirable to
reduce the risk for the Eurosystem in its liquidity
operations.
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Table A1: The ECB’s liquidity categories (1)
Category I Category II Category III Category IV Category V
Central government
debt instruments
Local and regional
government debt
instruments
Traditional covered
bank bonds
Credit institution
debt instruments
(unsecured)
Asset-backed
securities
Debt instruments
issued by NCBs (2)
Jumbo covered bank
bonds (3)
Debt instruments
issued by non-
financial corpora-
tions and other
issuers (4)
Debt instruments
issued by financial
corporations other
than credit institu-
tions (unsecured)
Agency debt
instruments (4)
Other covered bank
bonds (5)
Supranational debt
instruments
(1) In general, the issuer classification determines the liquidity category. However, all asset-backed securities are included in
category V, regardless of the classification of the issuer, and jumbo covered bank bonds are included in category II, while
(2) Debt certificates issued by the ECB and debt instruments issued by the NCBs prior to the adoption of the euro in their
respective Member State are included in liquidity category I.
(3) Only instruments with an issuing volume of at least EUR 1 billion, for which at least three market-makers provide regular bid
and ask quotes, fall into the asset class of jumbo covered bank bonds.
(4) Only marketable assets issued by issuers that have been classified as agencies by the ECB are included in liquidity category
II. Marketable assets issued by other agencies are included in liquidity category III or IV, depending on the issuer and ass
(5) Non-UCITS compliant covered bank bonds, including both structured covered bank bonds and multi-issuer covered bank
bonds are included in liquidity category III.
Source: European Central Bank.
ANNEX
Table A2: Valuation haircuts applied to collateral
Haircut categories
Credit
quality
Residual
maturity (yrs)
Category I Category II (*) Category III (*) Category IV (*) Category V (*)
fixed coupon zero coupon fixed coupon zero coupon fixed coupon zero coupon fixed coupon zero coupon
Steps 1 and
2 (AAA to A-)
(**)
0 - 1 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 6.5 6.5
10.0
1 - 3 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.0 3.0 8.5 9.0
3 - 5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 11.0 11.5
5 - 7 2.0 3.0 3.5 4.5 4.5 6.0 12.5 13.5
7 - 10 3.0 4.0 4.5 6.5 6.0 8.0 14.0 15.5
> 10 5.0 7.0 8.0 10.5 9.0 13.0 17.0 22.5
Step 3
(BBB+ to
BBB-) (**)
0 - 1 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 13.0 13.0
Not eligible
1 - 3 7.0 8.0 10.0 14.5 15.0 16.5 24.5 26.5
3 - 5 9.0 10.0 15.5 20.5 22.5 25.0 32.5 36.5
5 - 7 10.0 11.5 16.0 22.0 26.0 30.0 36.0 40.0
7 - 10 11.5 13.0 18.5 27.5 27.0 32.5 37.0 42.5
> 10 13.0 16.0 22.5 33.0 27.5 35.0 37.5 44.0
(*) Individual asset-backed securities, covered bank bonds (jumbo covered bank bonds, traditional covered bank bonds and other covered bank bonds) and
uncovered bank bonds that are theoretically valued in accordance with Section 6.5 of Annex I to Guideline ECB/2011/14 are subject to an additional valuation hair-
cut. This haircut is directly applied at the level of the theoretical valuation of the individual debt instrument in the form of a valuation markdown of 5 %. Furthermore,
an additional valuation markdown is applied to own-use covered bonds. This valuation markdown is 8 % for own-use covered bonds in CQS1&2 and 12 % for own-
use covered bonds in CQS3.
(**) Ratings are as specified in the Eurosystem’s harmonised rating scale, published on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu.
Source: European Central Bank.
